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This paper studies the costs and benefits of delegating decisions to superiorly informed agents 
relative to the use of rigid, non discretionary contracts. Delegation grants some flexibility in 
the choice of the action by the agent, but also requires the use of an appropriate incentive 
contract so as to realign his interests with those of the principal. The parties’ understanding of 
the possible circumstances in which actions will have to be chosen and their attitude towards 
risk and uncertainty play then an important role in determining the costs of delegation. The 
main focus of the paper lies indeed in the analysis of these costs and the consequences for 
whether or not delegation is optimal. 
We determine and characterize the properties of the optimal flexible contract both when the 
parties have sharp probabilistic beliefs over the possible events in which the agent will have 
to act and when they only have a set of such beliefs. We show that the higher the agent’s 
degree of risk aversion, the higher the agency costs for delegation and hence the less 
profitable is a flexible contract versus a rigid one. The agent’s imprecision aversion in the 
case of multiple priors introduces another, additional agency costs; it again implies that the 
higher the degree of imprecision aversion the less profitable flexible contracts versus rigid 
ones. Even though, with multiple priors, the contract may be designed in such a way that 
principal and agent end up using ’different beliefs’ and hence engage in speculative trade, this 
is never optimal, in contrast with the case where the parties have sharp heterogeneous beliefs. 
JEL-Code: D86, D82, D81. 
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Motivation. A central problem in organizations is the fact that agents assigned a given task
may end up having, at the time they have to act, some superior information on the suitability
of the various actions which can be taken to perform the assigned task. As a consequence,
it may be desirable, in order to enhance the performance of the organization, to grant agents
some degree of discretion in their choice of which action to undertake, or to ask them to report
their information before specifying which action should be carried out. The obvious diﬃculty in
doing this is that the interests of such agents may not be aligned with those of the organization.
This diﬃculty can be mitigated and possibly eliminated with the use of appropriate monetary
transfers to the agents, that is of appropriate compensation contracts. For such contracts to
work, some risk must be typically shifted to the agents. If agents are risk averse, doing this
is costly. Moreover, if the nature of the possible realizations of the uncertainty, that is of the
possible circumstances in which the actions might have to be taken and of their consequences,
is not clearly understood a priori, either because some unforeseen contingencies may arise or
because the probabilities of the possible events are not commonly agreed among the parties or
may be ’ambiguous’, some further diﬃculties and costs arise.
The presence of these costs implies that, in the decision of whether or not and to which
extent to delegate to an agent the choice of which action to undertake, a trade-oﬀ is faced. On
the one hand, the wider the uncertainty concerning the environment in which the agent will
have to take his action and the more important is for the organization the fact that the ’right’
action is taken in each possible circumstance, the higher are the beneﬁts of delegating the choice
to the agent, that is of oﬀering him a ﬂexible contract granting some ﬂexibility in his choice. On
the other hand, the extent and nature of this uncertainty also aﬀect the costs of delegation, in
a way which depends on the risk aversion of the agent, as well as on the degree of ’ambiguity’
of such uncertainty and the attitude towards it exhibited by the agent. The issue is important
as this trade-oﬀ naturally arises when the architecture of organizations is evaluated. The main
focus of this paper is on the analysis of this trade-oﬀ, and in particular of how the cost of
delegating decisions to superiorly informed agents varies with the structure of the uncertainty
and the agents’ attitude towards risk and uncertainty.
Model and results. To this end, we will consider a simple contracting situation between
2a principal and an agent. The agent must take a costly action which generates some revenue
for the principal. Before taking his action, but after signing the contract, the agent receives a
private signal over the productivity of the various actions. More precisely, we assume the agent
privately learns the realization of a variable which, together with the action chosen by the agent,
aﬀects the probability of the diﬀerent realizations of the principal’s revenue. The action chosen
by the agent is not observable by the principal but we suppose that, at the time of contracting,
the principal has the ability to predeﬁne the set of actions, or possible tasks, available to the
agent to choose. Thus the principal could specify a determinate action that the agent must
undertake in all the possible circumstances he may have to act - what we will call a rigid,o r
non discretionary, contract. Alternatively, the principal could leave the agent some discretion
in his behavior, so that the action the agent undertakes may vary with the information received
-aﬂexible contract.
Also, the cost for the agent of undertaking the various actions is deterministic. Hence in
the absence of monetary transfers contingent on the realization of the principal’s revenue the
interests of the principal and the agent are not aligned as the latter would always choose the least
costly action among the ones available to him. A ﬂexible contract must then include a suitably
designed compensation scheme, which might also vary with the agent’s report over the signal
received, so as to induce him to take the revenue maximizing action for each realization of the
signal. But such variability in the compensation generates possible agency costs. In contrast, a
rigid contract is simpler, does not need to rely on high-powered incentives and never incurs any
agency cost.
Consider ﬁrst the case where principal and agent have common and sharp probabilistic beliefs
over the possible events in which the agent will have to act. In this environment, if the agent
is risk neutral1, agency costs are zero and the optimal ﬂexible contract always dominates, at
least weakly, the rigid contract. The beneﬁts of the ﬂexible contract are larger the greater is the
variance of the productivity of the various actions the agent may undertake across the diﬀerent
realizations of the signal, that is the greater the relevance of the information received by the
agent. This is no longer true if the agent is risk averse, as agency costs are positive in that
case. We characterize the optimal ﬂexible contract when the agent has CARA preferences so
as to be able to isolate the eﬀects of changes in the agent’s risk aversion. We ﬁnd that at the
1We assume the principal is always risk neutral.
3optimal ﬂexible contract the agent’s compensation also depends on the agent’s report over the
signal received and that the agent’s utility is not equalized across diﬀerent realizations of the
signal. Also, an increase in the agent’s degree of (absolute) risk aversion implies a larger agency
cost, and hence a lower proﬁtability for the principal of the optimal ﬂexible contract relative to
the rigid contracts. Thus, for a suﬃciently high degree of risk aversion, a rigid contract always
dominates the ﬂexible one. On the other hand, the eﬀects of increasing risk aversion on the form
of the incentive contract, for instance on the variability in the compensation paid to the agent
across diﬀerent realizations of the output, prove more sensitive to changes in the parameters of
the environment.
We turn then our attention to situations where the information available to the parties con-
cerning the possible events in which the agent will have to act is not precise enough to pin down
a single probability distribution. This might be for instance because the circumstances under
which the agent ﬁnds himself to operate are totally new, with almost no information available.
Or it might capture the fact that these events are hard to describe precisely in full details.
We model this fact by assuming that principal and agent have a common set of probabilistic
beliefs over the likelihood of these events and allowing them to have possibly diﬀerent degrees of
imprecision aversion.2 We ﬁnd that if the agent is risk neutral the optimal ﬂexible contract still
always dominates the rigid contracts, though the principal’s revenue decreases in either party’s
degree of imprecision aversion. Even though, with multiple priors the compensation contract
may be designed in such a way that principal and agent end up “using diﬀerent beliefs”, and
hence possibly engage in mutually beneﬁcial speculative trade, this is never optimal. This stands
in contrast with the case in which both principal and agent have sharp, but diﬀerent prior be-
liefs, where the surplus generated by the contractual relationship is actually enhanced by the
possibility of exploiting the beneﬁts of speculative trade (as in Eliaz and Spiegler (2007)).
If, on the other hand, the agent is risk averse, the degree of his imprecision aversion aﬀects
the proﬁtability of the optimal ﬂexible contract relative to the rigid ones. This is because
the variability of the agent’s utility across realizations of the (ambiguous) signal is costly for
the agent. At the same time, as noticed above, such variability allows to enhance the agent’s
incentives. It then follows that imprecision aversion introduces another agency cost which is
2We then follow the contraction model of Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon, and Vergnaud (2008). An alternative
approach would have been to assume smooth ambiguity aversion ` a la Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci, Mukerji (2005).
4distinct from and adds to the cost induced by risk aversion. We ﬁnd in fact that, as the degree
of the agent’s imprecision aversion increases, the proﬁtability of the optimal ﬂexible contract
decreases relative to the rigid contracts. Also, the features of the contract are properly modiﬁed,
by reducing the utility diﬀerential across signal realizations, the more so the higher the degree
of imprecision aversion, so as to minimize such agency costs. The pattern of compensations
across states is thus diﬀerent with imprecision aversion and can even lead, when the degree of
imprecision aversion is suﬃciently high, to fully insure the agent across the diﬀerent states in
which he may have to act, something that is not possible with mere risk aversion. In contrast,
with heterogenous but sharp beliefs such utility diﬀerential increases with the heterogeneity of
beliefs, so as to exploit the opportunity of speculative trades, as the proﬁt diﬀerential in favor
of ﬂexible contracts.
Thus, the interaction of imprecision aversion with risk aversion has the eﬀect of further
increasing the cost of delegation and hence the relative cost of a ﬂexible contract.
Literature.
The choice in organizations between ﬂexible and rigid contracts has been examined in var-
ious other papers. Most of them however focused on the case where, in contrast to the setup
considered here, monetary transfers are not allowed and the objectives of principal and agent
are at least partly aligned. In such environments the agent may be willing to freely transmit
some of his private information to the principal. Dessein (2002) investigates the trade-oﬀ be-
tween contracts where the choice of the action is delegated to the agent and contracts where the
principal retains the control over such choice, but uses the information that is reported to him
by the agent. He examines in particular how such trade-oﬀ varies with the degree of congruence
between the objectives of the principal and the agent. Both Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Szalay
(2005) study the consequences of delegating - possibly only in part - control over the decision of
the action on the agent’s incentives to invest in acquiring information.
Probably the closest paper to ours in this literature is Prendergast (2002). He considers an
environment where, like in ours, monetary transfers are allowed, the structure of information
is given and the agent has superior information. He also examines how the relative beneﬁts of
ﬂexible and rigid contracts vary, but with respect to the magnitude of the uncertainty facing
the agent, that is the variability in the possible situations in which he may ﬁnd himself to act.
5Prendergast considers the case where the agent is risk neutral and agency costs are exogenously
given (as ﬁxed ’monitoring costs’). On the other hand our main focus here, as argued above, is
on the endogenous determination of such costs and the analysis of how they vary with the agent’s
attitude to uncertainty and the precision of the information of principal and agent concerning
the uncertainty they face in the contractual design.
A rather diﬀerent characterization of the trade-oﬀ between rigidity and ﬂexibility is provided
by Hart and Moore (2008), where the main cost of delegation lies in the variability of the outcome
prescribed by the contract and the deadweight losses this generates.
The eﬀects of ambiguity or imprecision in the probabilistic beliefs concerning the possible
realizations of the environment faced by parties in contractual situations have been ﬁrst examined
by Mukerji (1998) and Ghirardato (1994). Mukerji (1998) studies a vertical relationship problem,
using the Choquet expected utility model of Schmeidler (1989). He shows that, as a result of
ambiguity aversion, the optimal contract might be incomplete and, diﬀerently from our setup,
exhibit low powered incentives. Ghirardato (1994) looks at a standard moral hazard problem
but where parties’ “beliefs” are non-additive, reﬂecting uncertainty aversion: each action taken
by the agent induces a non-additive distribution on outcomes. His results are not directly
comparable with ours, in particular because of the use of diﬀerent underlying decision models.
He can show in some very particular case that a decrease in the degree of non additivity (i.e.,
imprecision in our setup) will not decrease the principal’s proﬁts.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the environment while Section
3 presents the contracting problem, studies its solutions and characterizes them. Section 4 then
studies the trade-oﬀ between ﬂexible and rigid contracts, how the choice of delegation varies
with diﬀerent features of the environment, in particular the agent’s attitude towards risk. In
the ﬁnal non probabilizable uncertainty over the possible circumstances in which decisions have
to be made is introduced and its consequences examined.
2 The set-up
We consider a contractual relationship between a principal, say a ﬁrm, and an agent, say a
worker. The worker has two possible actions, x and y. The output generated by each action
is uncertain: it can be either high ( ¯ R)o rl o w( R). The probability of the diﬀerent output
6realizations with action x (resp. y) is also uncertain and depends on some event θ ∈{ θ1,θ 2}:i t
is π(x,θ)( r e s p .π(y,θ)) for R = ¯ R.
We assume the contract is written before the realization of any source of uncertainty (i.e.,
before the output and θ are realized). In addition, the realization of the output is publicly
observable while the action chosen by the agent is only privately known by him. Further-
more θ, describing some events aﬀecting the execution/proﬁtability of the diﬀerent possible
tasks/actions, is only privately observed by the agent, not by the principal (or any third party).
To begin with, we examine the case where both principal and agent have suﬃcient information
over the generating process of this uncertainty to come up with a sharp probabilistic belief over
it: let p denote their common belief concerning the occurrence of θ1.
Although the action undertaken by the agent is not observable, we assume that the principal
can a priori impose some restrictions over the set of actions available to the agent. To understand
the nature of this restriction we can think, for instance, at a situation where the principal can
leave the agent free to choose among diﬀerent types of software (in which case both x and y are
available to the agent) or can decide to install only one software on the agent’s computer (in
which case only one action is available to the agent). In this framework, therefore a compensation
contract is a speciﬁcation of a set of admissible actions3 A ⊆{ x,y} together with a wage payment
w from the principal to the agent, where w can depend on the realized level of the output and
the agent’s announcement about the realization of the event θ. Let ¯ wi (resp. wi)d e n o t et h e
compensation paid to the agent when the output is ¯ R (resp. R) and the (declared) state is
θi,i=1 ,2.
In particular, we would like to distinguish the case where the full menu of possible actions
is available to the agent, A = {x,y}, from the cases where only action x -o ro n l ya c t i o ny -i s
available to the agent. We refer to the contract in the ﬁrst case as a ﬂexible contract,s i n c et h e
agent has the ﬂexibility and the discretion to choose the action he thinks is more appropriate for
him (and suitable incentives should be speciﬁed in the contract to induce the agent to make a
choice also in the principal’s interest). In the second case we say on the other hand the contract
is rigid, as it prescribes the agents to always undertake a given action. The contract can then
be of type x or of type y according to which action is speciﬁed.
3The possibility of imposing such restrictions was earlier considered in various papers starting with Holmstrom
(1984) (see Alonso and Matouschek (2008), Armstrong and Vickers (2009) for some recent contributions), typically
however in the absence of monetary transfers.
7It may help to think of the following time-line:
t = 0 The contract is signed, specifying the payments due to the agent for each possible real-
ization of the output and each announcement of the agent regarding θ. In addition the
contract speciﬁes the set A ⊆{ x,y} of possible actions available to the agent.
t =1 θ is observed by the agent who announces then its value to the principal.
t = 2 The agent undertakes an action z ∈ A, not observable by the principal.
t = 3 Output is revealed (i.e., uncertainty about output is resolved and output is observed)
t = 4 Compensation is paid to the agent, according to the realized output level and the agent’s
announcement.
Observe that at the time in which the contract is signed there is symmetric information
among the parties, the agent does not know the realization of the uncertainty. Asymmetric
information will arise at a later stage, when the agent learns some information about the prof-
itability of the diﬀerent actions, and chooses then which action to take.
Remark 1 We ignore here the possibility of renegotiation, in particular at the time in which
the realization of θ is learnt by the agent (t =1 ) .
The principal is the residual claimant of the output and is risk neutral. His payoﬀ, when
action zi,i=1 ,2, is implemented in state θi, is then given by the expected proﬁt:
p[π(z1,θ 1)( ¯ R − ¯ w1)+( 1− π(z1,θ 1))(R − w1)]
+(1 − p)[π(z2,θ 2)( ¯ R − ¯ w2)+( 1− π(z2,θ 2))(R − w2)]
The agent has a non separable4 utility function over the compensation received and the cost
cz of undertaking the action z ∈{ x,y} that is chosen. In particular, in most of the paper we
will assume the agent is risk averse and exhibits the following preferences:
Assumption 1 The agent has a CARA utility function: u(w,z)=−e−a(w−cz)
a ,w i t ha>0.
4A nonseparable utility function in the wage received and the cost incurred allows us to study the comparative
statics properties of the optimal contract with respect to the agent’s level of risk aversion - one of our objectives.
With such speciﬁcation in fact the rate of substitution between actions and wages is constant and changes in
the curvature of the agent’s utility function only capture changes in the agent’s attitude towards risk in the
compensation.
8The agent’s risk attitude is then described by the single parameter a. It is then convenient
to normalize the agent’s reservation utility as −e−a¯ u
a .
Our main goal is to investigate in this set-up the relative proﬁtability of ﬂexible and rigid
contracts. While the ﬂexible contract oﬀers the agent the opportunity to choose the best action
in each possible contingency, delegating the choice to the agent creates an agency problem,
since the action is not observable. Hence the wage schedule will be constrained to satisfy a set
of appropriate incentive compatibility constraints. On the other hand, in a rigid contract no
agency problem arises, since the agent has no discretion, but the action implemented cannot be
adjusted to the diﬀerent contingencies.
We will assume that action x is both more costly and more productive than action y.A tt h e
same time, the additional productivity of action x, relative to action y, is uncertain: it is larger
in state θ1 than in state θ2.
Assumption 2
• cx >c y, i.e., Δc ≡ cx − cy > 0.
• π(x,θ1) >π (x,θ2) >π (y,θ2) >π (y,θ1)
Moreover, we will focus our attention on the case where the eﬀect of θ on the anticipated
proﬁtability of the diﬀerent actions is suﬃciently important that in state θ1 the expected revenue
net of the cost is higher for action x and in state θ2 it is for action y:
Assumption 3 (π(x,θ1) − π(y,θ1))( ¯ R − R) > Δc>(π(x,θ2) − π(y,θ2))( ¯ R − R)
Thus, if there were no agency problems (that is, if both θ and the agent’s action were publicly
observed), the optimal contract would implement action x in θ1 and y in θ2.
3 Contracts
3.1 Optimal ﬂexible contract
In our setup a diﬀerent action in each of the two states can only be implemented with a ﬂexible
contract, and is then subject to appropriate incentive constraints. Under Assumptions 2 and 3
it is clear that the optimal action proﬁle to be implemented at a ﬂexible contract is also given
9by x in state θ1 and y in θ2. Hence the optimal ﬂexible contract is obtained as a solution of the
following programme:
max ¯ w1,w1, ¯ w2,w2 p[π(x,θ1)( ¯ R − ¯ w1)+( 1− π(x,θ1))(R − w1)]
+(1 − p)[π(y,θ2)( ¯ R − ¯ w2)+( 1− π(y,θ2))(R − w2)]
s.t. ⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
(IC1) π(x,θ1)e−a(¯ w1−cx) +( 1− π(x,θ1))e−a(w1−cx) ≤ π(x,θ1)e−a(¯ w2−cx) +( 1− π(x,θ1))e−a(w2−cx)
(IC2) π(x,θ1)e−a(¯ w1−cx) +( 1− π(x,θ1))e−a(w1−cx) ≤ π(y,θ1)e−a(¯ w2−cy) +( 1− π(y,θ1))e−a(w2−cy)
(IC3) π(x,θ1)e−a(¯ w1−cx) +( 1− π(x,θ1))e−a(w1−cx) ≤ π(y,θ1)e−a(¯ w1−cy) +( 1− π(y,θ1))e−a(w1−cy)
(IC4) π(y,θ2)e−a(¯ w2−cy) +( 1− π(y,θ2))e−a(w2−cy) ≤ π(x,θ2)e−a(¯ w1−cx) +( 1− π(x,θ2))e−a(w1−cx)
(IC5) π(y,θ2)e−a(¯ w2−cy) +( 1− π(y,θ2))e−a(w2−cy) ≤ π(x,θ2)e−a(¯ w2−cx) +( 1− π(x,θ2))e−a(w2−cx)
(IC6) π(y,θ2)e−a(¯ w2−cy) +( 1− π(y,θ2))e−a(w2−cy) ≤ π(y,θ2)e−a(¯ w1−cy) +( 1− π(y,θ2))e−a(w1−cy)
(PC) p[π(x,θ1)e−a(¯ w1−cx) +( 1− π(x,θ1))e−a(w1−cx)]+
(1 − p)[π(y,θ2)e−a(¯ w2−cy) +( 1− π(y,θ2))e−a(w2−cy)] ≤ e−a¯ u
(Pflex)
where constraints (IC1)-(IC6) are the incentive compatibility constraints associated to the pos-
sible deviations of the agent, given by misreporting one or both the signals received and/or
undertaking a diﬀerent action than the one speciﬁed in one or both of the states; (PC) is then
the participation constraint.
We show in the next proposition that, at a solution of this problem, only constraints (IC2),
(IC6) and (PC) bind and we also derive some properties of the optimal compensation scheme
of the agent.
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1-3, a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence
of the optimal ﬂexible contract is
1−π(y,θ1)
1−π(x,θ1) ≥ eaΔc. At such contract action x is implemented
in state θ1 and y in θ2 and the agent’s compensation is obtained as solution of the following
simpliﬁed problem:
max ¯ w1,w1, ¯ w2,w2 p[π(x,θ1)( ¯ R − ¯ w1)+( 1− π(x,θ1))(R − w1)]
+(1 − p)[π(y,θ2)( ¯ R − ¯ w2)+( 1− π(y,θ2))(R − w2)]
s.t. (IC2),(IC6),(PC) holding as equalities and ¯ w1 ≥ ¯ w2, ¯ w2 ≥ w2
and exhibits the following properties:
¯ w1 ≥ ¯ w2 >w 2 ≥ w1.
10Let u(θ1)=−π(x,θ1)e−a(¯ w1−cx)−(1−π(x,θ1))e−a(w1−cx)] denote the agent’s expected utility
when state θ1 occurs; similarly, u(θ2)=−π(y,θ2)e−a(¯ w2−cy)−(1−π(y,θ2))e−a(w2−cy) is the utility
when θ2 occurs. The properties we showed that (IC2) is binding at an optimum and ¯ w2 >w 2,
together with the fact that π(y,θ1) <π (y,θ2), have the following important implication:
Corollary 1 At the optimal ﬂexible contract, u(θ2) >u (θ1).
Thus even though the less costly action y is implemented in state θ2 the optimal contract is
still characterized in that state by a wage that varies with the output realizations. At the same
time, the utility of the compensation paid to the manager is higher in state θ2 than in θ1. The
variability in w2 and the lack of smoothing in the agent’s utility across the realizations of θ can
both be justiﬁed as a way to reduce the variability in the compensation of the wage paid in θ1:
it can in fact be veriﬁed (see also the following sections) that (IC2), (IC6) and (PC) can all be
satisﬁed as equality also with a constant level of w2 - and hence with the same utility for the
agent in state θ2 as in θ1 - but this is suboptimal.
Remark 2 To further understand the determinants of these properties of the optimal ﬂexible
contract, it is useful to compare them with those of the optimal contract obtained when the
realization of θ is publicly observable. In that case actions x and y are still implemented in
states θ1 and θ2, but we can show5 that we have ¯ w2 = w2 as well as ¯ w1 >w 1, and the agent’s
expected utility is the same in state θ1 as in θ2. Thus the variability in w2 and the agent’s
utility we found in the optimal ﬂexible contract in Proposition 1 is due to the need to address
the incentive problems arising from the agent’s private information over θ (a lower variability
in w2 can only be achieved, as we already argued, at the cost of a higher variability of w1).
3.2 Rigid contracts
The optimal rigid contract implementing action z, z = x,y, in every state is obtained as a
solution of the following programme (note that the only constraint is given by PC, no incentive
compatibility constraint appears here as the agent has no discretion over the choice of his action):
5When θ is observable the only incentive constraints which need to be considered are (IC3), (IC6), the problem
is clearly simpler and an explicit solution for the optimal compensation scheme can be derived. See Appendix B,
available online at http://www.eui.eu/Personal/Gottardi/ for a formal derivation.
11max ¯ w1,w1, ¯ w2,w2 p[π(z,θ1)( ¯ R − ¯ w1)+( 1− π(z,θ1))(R − w1)]
+(1 − p)[π(z,θ2)( ¯ R − ¯ w2)+( 1− π(z,θ2))(R − w2)]
(PC) p[π(z,θ1)e−a(¯ w1−cz) +( 1− π(z,θ1))e−a(w1−cz)]+
(1 − p)[π(z,θ2)e−a(¯ w2−cz) +( 1− π(z,θ2))e−a(w2−cz)]=e−a¯ u
(Prig)
Its solution is very simple in the present framework: the wage should be constant ( ¯ w1 =
w1 =¯ w2 = w2 = wz), at the level determined by the participation constraint, thus equal to the
expected cost of undertaking action z.I np a r t i c u l a r :
i) Fixed x contract: the compensation is wx =¯ u + cx, and proﬁts are:
[pπ(x,θ1)+( 1− p)π(x,θ2)] ¯ R +[ p(1 − π(x,θ1)) + (1 − p)(1 − π(x,θ2))]R − ¯ u − cx
ii) Fixed y contract: the compensation is wy =¯ u + cy, and proﬁts are:
[pπ(y,θ1)+( 1− p)π(y,θ2)] ¯ R +[ p(1 − π(y,θ1)) + (1 − p)(1 − π(y,θ2))]R − ¯ u − cy
4 The choice between ﬂexible and rigid contracts
We are now ready to compare the expected proﬁts of the principal at the optimal ﬂexible
contract, which we can ﬁnd by substituting the values of the agent’s compensation obtained by
solving the problem in Proposition 1 into the principal’s objective function, with the expected
proﬁts of the rigid contracts found in the previous section. We can then determine which type of
contract is preferable. In particular, we intend to analyze how the choice of the type of contract
depends on the level of various parameters of the environment (the cost of undertaking the
diﬀerent types of actions, their probabilities of success, describing both the relative productivity
of the diﬀerent actions as well as the relevance of the uncertainty aﬀecting them, preferences
and in particular the agent’s risk attitude).
As we said, in the optimal ﬂexible contract the agent’s action can be better tailored to the
diﬀerent circumstances under which the agent may ﬁnd himself to operate. However there is
also an agency cost in delegating the choice of the action to the agent since the action is not
observable and the agent’s objectives are not aligned to those of the principal. We should expect
therefore that the advantages of ﬂexibility will be higher the bigger is the diﬀerence between the
12productivity of the two types of actions in state θ1 relative to the other state θ2 as well as the
smaller is the ’agency cost’ which has to be paid to implement the action proﬁle x,y.
Since Proposition 1 only provides, as we noticed, an implicit form solution for the values of
the agent’s compensation at the optimal ﬂexible contract, in the analysis of this section we rely
on the consideration of a numerical example, for which the optimal payment schedule can be
solved numerically. The parameters describing the environment exhibit the following values:
a p ¯ u ¯ R R cx cy π(x,θ1) π(x,θ2) π(y,θ1) π(y,θ2)
1 .5 1 10 5 1.5 1 .8 .45 .2 .4
Table 1: Parameter values for the comparative static exercise
The results obtained below prove however to be robust to changes in the parameter chosen.
4.1 Comparative statics with respect to actions’ productivity and cost
Our ﬁndings for the comparative statics properties with respect to the levels of the probability
of success for each action and event in which it is undertaken and to the cost of the diﬀerent
types of actions cz are summarized in the following table :
Parameter π(x,θ1) π(x,θ2) π(y,θ1) π(y,θ2) cx cy
Range [.75,.9] [.35,.55] [.15,.25] [.3,.5] [1.2,1.8] [.7,1.25]
Proﬁt ﬂexible - proﬁt x + −−+ ??
Proﬁt ﬂexible - proﬁt y +=−−− +
¯ w1 − w1 − =+?+ −
¯ w2 − w2 − = − + + −
u(θ2) − u(θ1) − = − + + −
Table 2: Comparative statics with respect to probabilities and costs
For instance, the ﬁrst column reports the sign of the eﬀects of increasing π(x,θ1), within
the interval indicated, [.75,.9], while keeping the other parameters ﬁxed at the values indicated
in Table 1 on the following variables: (i) the diﬀerential between the expected proﬁts at the
optimal ﬂexible contract and those at the x rigid contract in the ﬁrst row and at the y one in
the second row; (ii) the spread between the compensation paid for the high and low realization
of the output when state θ1 occurs in the third row and when θ2 occurs in the fourth one; (iii)
the diﬀerence in expected utility in the two states. A + (resp. -) sign indicates the increase in
13the parameter value always increases (decreases) the corresponding variable, while a ? indicates
the eﬀect is ambiguous, not always of the same sign.
In particular, we ﬁnd that the proﬁtability of the ﬂexible contract, relative to both rigid
contracts, increases if π(x,θ1) (probability of success with action x in state 1) increases, or
π(y,θ1) decreases. Such changes increase the productivity of the costlier action (x)r e l a t i v et o
the less costly one in state θ1 as well as relative to state θ2. The same eﬀects are obtained with
a decrease in π(x,θ2), reducing the diﬀerence between the productivity of actions x and y in
state θ2. On the other hand, a change in π(y,θ2) has opposite eﬀects of the proﬁtability of the
ﬂexible contract relative to the two rigid ones, while the eﬀect of increasing the costs cx and cy
of the two actions on the same proﬁt diﬀerence is non monotonic.
We also see that the variability in the compensation paid in the state θ2, where the less costly
action is implemented, always moves in the same direction as the utility diﬀerential u(θ2)−u(θ1),
suggesting these two are complementary instruments to address the incentive problems generated
by the private information over θ, as already mentioned in Remark 2.
4.2 Comparative statics with respect to risk aversion
Another important determinant of the agency costs of implementing a variable action proﬁle
and hence of the trade-oﬀ between ﬂexible and rigid contracts is the agent’s risk attitude. As
shown above, the compensation paid at the rigid contracts is independent of the agent’s degree
of risk aversion (as described, in the case of CARA preferences, by the single parameter a); this
on the other hand, matters for the optimal ﬂexible contract.
To see the consequences of the agent’s risk attitude it is useful to consider ﬁrst the extreme
case where the agent is also risk neutral. In that case, agency costs are zero as the ﬁrst best can
be implemented, that is the principal can attain the same level of proﬁts as when all incentive
compatibility constraints are ignored.
Proposition 2 When the agent is risk neutral the optimal ﬂexible contract is ﬁrst best optimal.
The expected proﬁt level is p[π(x,θ1) ¯ R+(1−π(x,θ1))R]+(1−p)[π(y,θ2) ¯ R+(1−π(y,θ2))R]−
14¯ u − pcx − (1 − p)cy and an optimal compensation6 is given by








¯ w2 = w2 =¯ u + cy
Under Assumption 3, therefore, with risk neutrality the ﬂexible contract is always better
than the rigid ones. On the other hand, when the agent is risk averse (a>0) agency costs are
positive, as in order to satisfy the incentive constraints the principal’s proﬁts have to be reduced
from their ﬁrst best level. This clearly implies the ﬂexible contract may no longer dominate the
rigid contracts.
Still based on the parameterization described in Table 1, we provide below a characterization
of the comparative statics eﬀects of varying the agent’s degree of risk aversion a.
Figure 1 shows how the diﬀerence between the expected proﬁts at the optimal ﬂexible con-
tract and the two rigid contracts changes with a. We see this relationship is monotonically
decreasing. For low levels of risk aversion, the ﬂexible contract is preferable to the two rigid
contracts, but as a increases the proﬁt diﬀerential becomes progressively smaller and eventually,
from a ∼ 1.6 onwards in the situation considered, the ﬁxed contract specifying the task x to the
agent becomes optimal. This pattern appears to be robust to changes in the value of the other
parameters and shows that agency costs are increasing with the agent’s risk aversion7. Hence
we can say that agency costs are increasing and the advantages of delegation decreasing in the
agent’s degree of risk aversion.
The next two ﬁgures illustrate then the implications of the level of the agent’s degree of
risk aversion for the speciﬁc properties of the optimal ﬂexible contract. In particular, Figure 2
describes the eﬀect of varying a on the spread between the compensation paid for the high and
low output realizations at the optimal ﬂexible contract respectively in state θ1 (i.e. ¯ w1−w1)a n d
θ2. It shows that the spread in state θ1 is ﬁrst decreasing and then increasing in a while the
spread in θ2 is always increasing in a. Figure 3 shows that the utility diﬀerential also varies non
monotonically with a, ﬁrst increasing and then decreasing.
6Note that this compensation scheme yields u(θ2)=u(θ1).
7A similar pattern also obtains when the realization of θ is commonly observed: increasing risk aversion makes
the rigid contracts more attractive. The proﬁts of the ﬂexible contract when θ is observable are strictly higher
than when θ is only privately observed, and we ﬁnd the diﬀerence is increasing in risk aversion.













































































Figure 1: Proﬁt diﬀerential between the ﬂexible and rigid contracts as a function of risk aversion
We should point out however that the properties found in Figures 2 and 3, unlike those of
Figure 1, are not quite robust to changes in the values of the parameters considered in Table
18. The eﬀects of risk aversion for the properties of optimal incentive contracts prove then to
be rather complex, as also found by Jullien, Salani´ e and Salani´ e (1999).


































Figure 2: Wage diﬀerentials at the optimal ﬂexible contract as a function of risk aversion
Trying to disentangle the various eﬀects of risk aversion, we can ﬁrst observe that increasing
a makes the participation constraint, ceteris paribus, harder to satisfy: such constraint requires
the certainty equivalent of the lottery with outcomes ¯ w1 − cx,w1 − cx,¯ w2 − cy,w2 − cy to equal
8Even when θ is observable we ﬁnd for instance that the spread of the compensation paid in state θ1 can be
non monotonic or monotonically decreasing depending on the values of the parameters.





























Figure 3: Utility diﬀerential u(θ2) − u(θ1) at the optimal ﬂexible contract as a function of a
¯ u, but this certainty equivalent decreases with risk aversion.
Each of the two incentive constraints which are binding at an optimum solution, (IC2) and
(IC6), then requires a pair of distinct lotteries to have the same expected utility. In the case of
(IC2) we cannot rank the two lotteries that are compared, ( ¯ w1 −cx,w1 −cx) (with probabilities
π(x,θ1),1−π(x,θ1)) and ( ¯ w2 −cy,w2 −cy) (with probabilities π(y,θ1),1−π(y,θ1)), in terms of
riskiness. We know w1 − cx is the smallest outcome but we do not know how to rank ¯ w1 − cx
versus ¯ w2 − cy for instance. Furthermore, the attached probabilities are not the same. Thus,
the eﬀect of risk aversion on this constraint is diﬃcult to assess. On the other hand, for (IC6)
we can unambiguously say that one of the two lotteries compared is riskier than the other and
hence that increasing risk aversion loosens this constraint (i.e., that if the compensation is kept
constant when a the constraint becomes slack). Hence, we can say that when a increases, (PC)
is harder to satisfy while (IC6) is easier, and the eﬀect on (IC2) is unclear.
5 The choice of delegation with ambiguity
We examine now the case where, at the time the contract is written the information available
to the parties concerning the likelihood of the events θ1,θ 2 is not precise enough for them to
have a sharp probability belief over them. This appears rather natural if we are to think of such
events as possible contingencies not clearly deﬁned at the contracting stage.
For this purpose, we need a tractable model of decision under uncertainty in such situations,
that allows for a simple parameterization of individuals’ attitude towards uncertainty, and in
17particular their ambiguity aversion. We use the model developed by Gajdos, Hayashi, Tallon,
Vergnaud (2008) (GHTV henceforth), to which we refer the reader for further details.
In this approach, the decision maker is given some information in the form of a set of
(“objective”) distributions over the state space. He then uses a maxmin expected utility criterion
` a la Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), taking as the set of “priors” a subset of the objective
distributions.9 The smaller the subset, the less ambiguity averse the decision maker. In the
limit, if he uses only one distribution in his computation, he is ambiguity neutral (i.e., Bayesian).
The model thus gives some structure to the set of priors “used” by the decision maker (contrary
to Gilboa and Schmeidler’s approach, where the set could be anything since there is no modeled
objective set of distributions representing the information available).
Formally, we assume here the set of probability distributions over θ1 occurring is described
by the values p ∈ [p, ¯ p], which is thus the available information to both parties.10 In the partic-
ular set-up we are considering, with only two “imprecise” states θ1,θ 2, such criterion amounts
to the following: the agent (respectively, the principal) evaluates each possible action according
to the minimal expected utility with respect to all p ∈ [p + α, ¯ p − α]( r e s p .p ∈ [p + ψ, ¯ p − ψ]).
The parameter α describes the agent’s imprecision aversion, and ψ that of the principal. The
case α = 0 is one of extreme imprecision aversion from the agent: he considers all the possible
probability distributions and focuses, for each decision, on the one that yields him the worst
possible expected utility. The other extreme case is α =
¯ p−p
2 which corresponds to expected
utility (imprecision neutrality) from the agent: he acts in the same way with imprecise infor-
mation as in the problem with precise information given by the central probability distribution.
Thus the lower is α, the higher the agent’s imprecision aversion; in what follows it will thus be
convenient to take −α as a measure of the agent’s imprecision aversion (and similarly −ψ for
the principal).
We will analyze the consequences of changes in the degree of imprecision aversion of both
the principal and the agent for the form of the optimal ﬂexible contract and the choice between
ﬂexible and rigid contracts. We will compare them with the consequences of changes in the
9Note that in the very simple case we look at, this criterion is the same as the one in the α-MEU model of
Jaﬀray (1989) and Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci (2004). Although formally identical to GHTV’s model
when there are only two states of nature, in a setup with diﬀerent agents these models do not provide a clear link
between the set of priors of the various decision makers.
10The center of this interval, ˆ p ≡
p+¯ p
2 , is then the “central” probability in GHTV’s decision criterion.
18agent’s degree of risk aversion we derived in the previous section. In this regard, it is important
to point out that while the degree of risk aversion concerns both the uncertainty over the
environment in which decisions will be made (described by θ) as well as the uncertainty over
the output realizations, the degree of imprecision aversion only concerns the ﬁrst source of
uncertainty (θ). This is to reﬂect the fact that, at the contracting stage there is uncertainty
concerning the circumstances in which actions will have to be taken in the future, but once θ is
realized, the probability distribution of output realizations is not ambiguous.
5.1 Risk neutral but imprecision averse agent and principal
We start with the case of a risk neutral agent and introduce imprecision aversion, possibly
for both parties. The optimal ﬂexible contract is now obtained as solution of the problem of
maximizing, with respect to ¯ w1,w1, ¯ w2,w2, the following expression of the principal’s utility:
minp∈[p+ψ,¯ p−ψ]
 
p[π(x,θ1)( ¯ R − ¯ w1)+( 1− π(x,θ1))(R − w1)]
+( 1− p)[π(y,θ2)( ¯ R − ¯ w2)+( 1− π(y,θ2))(R − w2)]
 
subject to the agent’s participation constraint, given by
minp∈[p+α,¯ p−α] {p[π(x,θ1)¯ w1 +( 1− π(x,θ1))w1 − cx]+
(1 − p)[π(y,θ2)¯ w2 +( 1− π(y,θ2))w2 − cy]}≥¯ u,
and his incentive compatibility constraints. These are however not aﬀected by the presence of
imprecision, which bears only on the θ-state; their expression is then the same as in the previous
section (see (8)) and is so omitted.
We can again show that under risk neutrality the principal can attain the same utility as
when the incentive constraints are ignored, that is the optimal ﬂexible contract is ﬁrst best
optimal. Moreover, it has the feature that one party is always fully insured across the θ-states.
Which one depends obviously on the relative imprecision aversion of principal and agent.
Proposition 3 When the agent is risk neutral but both principal and agent may be imprecision
averse, the optimal ﬂexible contract is still ﬁrst best optimal. Moreover:,
• If ψ>α(i.e., the principal is less imprecision averse than the agent), the agent is fully
insured: π(x,θ1)¯ w1 +( 1− π(x,θ1))w1 − cx = π(y,θ2)¯ w2 +( 1− π(y,θ2))w2 − cy.
19• If α>ψ(i.e., the agent is less imprecision averse than the principal), the principal is fully
insured: π(x,θ1)( ¯ R− ¯ w1)+(1−π(x,θ1))(R−w1)=π(y,θ2)( ¯ R− ¯ w2)+(1−π(y,θ2))(R−w2).11
In the proof we ﬁrst show that at the optimal contract the expected utility of principal and
agent vary comonotonically at the θ states and then that the more imprecision averse party is
fully insured. The idea of the argument for the second part of the proof is as follows. Suppose
ψ>αand take for instance a situation in which the agent has a higher expected wage in state
θ1 than in state θ2. This means that, when computing his expected utility, he is actually using
the probabilistic belief that puts the least weight on state θ1,n a m e l yp + α. The net gain from
transferring one euro from state θ1 to θ2 is hence equal to 1 − 2(p + α). For the principal, the
net gain of transferring one euro from θ2 to θ1 is either −1+2 ( p + ψ)o r−1+2 (¯ p − ψ). The
sum of the net gains from this operation is always positive and hence it is always beneﬁcial to
make such transfer. A perfectly symmetric reasoning holds when the agent has a lower expected
wage in state θ1 than in state θ2. Hence, when ψ>αit is optimal for the principal to provide
full insurance.
We obtain a similar result for the rigid contracts. When the agent is more imprecision averse
than the principal (ψ>α ), the agent is fully insured, that is the wage is constant, equal to
¯ u + cx at the x contract, as in the case of a single prior (or imprecision neutrality). On the
other hand, the agent fully insures the principal when the latter is more imprecision averse
than the agent (α>ψ ). Note that in such case rigid contracts are characterized by variable
wages, unlike when there is a single prior, as wages will be designed so that the principal’s
proﬁts are the same for the two θ realizations: π(x,θ1)( ¯ R − ¯ wx) − (1 − π(x,θ1))(R − wx)=
π(x,θ2)( ¯ R − ¯ wx) − (1 − π(x,θ2))(R − wx) and similarly for ¯ wy and wy. Using the participation
constraint yields the optimal wage schedule.
Comparing the principal’s utility at the optimal ﬂexible contract with that at the rigid
contracts yields the following:12
Proposition 4 Under Assumption 3, with risk neutrality and possibly imprecision aversion of
both principal and agent, the optimal ﬂexible contract always dominates the rigid ones.
Also, the expected utility of the principal at this contract is
11We leave aside the limit case ψ = α, similar in all respects to the risk neutrality and imprecision neutrality
case studied in the previous sections.
12The proﬁts for the two ﬁxed contracts are reported in table 4 in the Appendix.
20(i) decreasing in the agent’s degree of imprecision aversion −α and does not depend on ψ
when α>ψ ,
(ii) decreasing in the principal’s degree of imprecision aversion −ψ and does not depend on
α when α<ψ .
The ﬁrst part of the claim can be better understood by observing that in each of these
cases the beliefs used by principal and agent are the same both in the ﬂexible and the rigid
contracts and we know that with single priors, under Assumption 3, the optimal ﬂexible contract
dominates the rigid ones when there are no agency costs. Thus, the choice between ﬂexible and
rigid contracts is not aﬀected, under risk neutrality, by the presence of imprecision aversion.
On the other hand, the second part of the claim shows that the principal’s utility is itself not
independent of imprecision aversion, but is rather (weakly) decreasing with imprecision aversion
(of either party.) It can be checked that the same is true at the rigid contracts: at both the x
and y contracts the principal’s utility is (weakly) decreasing with imprecision aversion of either
party.
Overall, this shows that even though with imprecision aversion a suitably designed contract
could induce the parties to use diﬀerent “beliefs”, this is never optimal, even at the ﬁrst best
where incentive constraints (including those concerning reporting over θ) are ignored. To see
this, it is useful to contrast the situation we examined with the one where the two parties have
single, but diﬀerent prior beliefs over θ,s a ypA <p P, where pA (resp. pP) is the agent’s (resp.
principal’s) belief over θ1 occurring. With heterogeneous beliefs we ﬁnd that at the ﬁrst best
contract such diﬀerence in beliefs is always exploited: when pA <p P, adding x to the wage






both the principal’s proﬁt and the agent’s utility. Thus expected wages and expected proﬁts
vary anti-comonotonically at the θ states, to exploit the mutually beneﬁcial (speculative) trades
allowed by the diﬀerence in beliefs, in contrast with what we found with imprecision aversion.
The fact that θ is agent’s private information over θ limits the extent by which such gains from
speculation can be exploited, but still we ﬁnd the principal’s utility is increasing in the beliefs’
diﬀerence. This is again in contrast with the eﬀect found in Proposition 4 of increasing the
parties’ imprecision aversion, even though this too augments the diﬀerence between the beliefs
which may end up being used by them.
21To understand such diverse ﬁndings, we should point out that with imprecision aversion the
“beliefs” used by each party adapt to the payments he receives in a conservative way. Hence
to induce the parties to use diﬀerent beliefs, the payments should be modiﬁed in the opposite
direction to the one needed to exploit gains from speculative trades, which is clearly non optimal.
To conclude, imprecision aversion of the parties simply decreases the overall surplus avail-
able from the relationship when the agent is risk neutral but does not aﬀect the eﬃciency of
contracting. First best is still achievable, the trade oﬀ between ﬁxed and ﬂexible contracts is
not aﬀected, but the surplus to be split is smaller with imprecision aversion than it is with
imprecision neutrality.
5.2 Risk aversion and imprecision aversion
We now examine the eﬀects of imprecision aversion of the two parties in the original setup,
where the agent is risk averse and his preferences are as in Assumption 1. We will show that,
in contrast to the case of risk neutrality, the trade oﬀ between ﬂexible and rigid contracts is
aﬀected by the presence of imprecision aversion.
As in the previous section, the degree of imprecision aversion of the agent only matters
for the speciﬁcation of the participation constraint; the incentive compatibility constraints are
independent of p and the same as in the speciﬁcation of the problem with a single prior, (Pflex)
of Section 3.1. The characterization of the optimal ﬂexible contract proves to be similar to that
of the case with a single prior (given in Proposition 1 and Corollary 1), provided the principal
is less imprecision averse than the agent (i.e., that risk aversion and imprecision aversion go in
the same direction):13
Proposition 5 Suppose Assumptions 1-3 hold, both principal and agent are imprecision averse
and the principal is less imprecision averse than the agent (i.e. ψ>α ). Then at the optimal
ﬂexible contract the only binding constraints are (IC2), (IC6), (PC) and payments are such that
¯ w1 ≥ ¯ w2 ≥ w2 ≥ w1 (with ¯ w1 >w 1).
Since ¯ w2 ≥ w2, the fact that (IC2) and (IC6) hold with equality together with the fact that
π(y,θ2) >π (y,θ1) imply, as we saw in Section 3.1, that u(θ2) ≥ u(θ1) (with the equality holding
13When such condition is violated (the agent is less imprecision averse than the principal) we do not have
general characterization results and the analysis of some numerical examples suggests the properties of the optimal
contract may be rather diﬀerent.
22if and only if ¯ w2 = w2). Hence the agent will use beliefs ¯ p − α (if u(θ2) >u (θ1)) or any p in
[p + α, ¯ p − α]( w h e nu(θ2)=u(θ1)) in his evaluation of minimal expected utility. The main
diﬀerence with the result in Proposition 1 is that we cannot rule out the case ¯ w2 = w2,i nw h i c h
case the agent is fully insured across θ-state.
Actually we will show that, if imprecision aversion is suﬃciently larger for the agent than for
the principal, there are parameter conﬁgurations such that, at the optimal contract the principal
fully insures the agent across the θ states, u(θ2)=u(θ1), and across the output realizations in
the θ2 state by setting a constant wage ¯ w2 = w2.
We will illustrate this property for the same environment described in Table 1. Assume,
in addition, that the principal is imprecision neutral and the information available over θ is
minimal, that is ¯ p =1a n dp =0 .
Figure 4 describes how the diﬀerence between u(θ2)a n du(θ1), at the optimal ﬂexible contract
varies with the degree of the imprecision aversion of the agent (measured as we said by −α). The
way to read Figure 4 is as follows: as −α goes from −.5 (in which case the agent is imprecision
neutral) to its maximal level (−.05), u(θ2)−u(θ1) decreases and eventually (at around α = .15)
becomes zero. Figure 5 shows the spread between the compensation paid for high and low
output realization respectively in state θ1 and θ2.
How can we understand such ﬁndings? Note ﬁrst that the property we found when par-
ties have a single prior that incentives are helped by a variable wage in state θ2, and hence
u(θ2) >u (θ1), is still valid. However, imprecision aversion introduces an additional cost for this
variability since at the ﬁrst best, as we saw in the previous section, the agent is fully insured
across θ states (when ψ>α ). This cost is increasing in the agent’s degree of imprecision aversion
and constitutes an additional agency cost (besides risk aversion) due to imprecision aversion.
Hence we face a trade-oﬀ between enhancing incentives and minimizing agency costs. When −α
is suﬃciently high (above −.15 in the example) the latter eﬀect prevails over the ﬁrst one and
the agent is fully insured across θ states at the optimal contract.
We consider next the eﬀect of imprecision aversion on the choice between the optimal ﬂexible
and the rigid contracts in this same environment. With risk aversion this eﬀect proves again
rather complex.
For this we need ﬁrst to determine the properties of the rigid contracts. It is immediate to
see that they are the same as in the case where parties have a single prior studied in Section
23Figure 4: Utility diﬀerential at the optimal contract as a function of imprecision aversion






































































Figure 5: Wage diﬀerentials at the optimal contract as a function of imprecision aversion
243.1: the principal fully insures the agent both across θ-states and within each θ state. This is
achieved by setting a constant wage ¯ w = w = w, which is obtained by solving the participation
constraint, yielding w =¯ u + cx (for the x contract, and similarly for the y one).
Figure 6 portrays the diﬀerence between the principal’s utility at the optimal ﬂexible contract
and at the two rigid contracts as a function of the agent’s degree of imprecision aversion.




































































Figure 6: Proﬁt diﬀerential as a function of imprecision aversion
The general decreasing shape is similar to the one found with respect to risk aversion (see
Figure 1) and reﬂects the fact that, as noticed above, agency costs are increasing in the agent’s
degree of imprecision aversion. On the other hand, the mechanism behind and the nature of
such costs are rather diﬀerent, as attested by the diversity in the pattern of the wage spread
and utility diﬀerentials (contrast Figures 4 and 5 with Figures 2 and 3 respectively.) We see in
particular that the proﬁt diﬀerential decreases until −α reaches a level of around −.15 and is
then constant beyond that; as we noticed above, for −α>−.15 the agent is fully insured across
the θ states, thus the agency costs due to further increasing the agent’s imprecision aversion are
zero.
We end this section by contrasting again these ﬁndings with those obtained when parties
are imprecision neutral but have diﬀerent beliefs pP and pA over the realization of state θ1.I n
particular we consider the case where pP and pA are exactly the same as the “beliefs used” by
the parties at the optimal ﬂexible contracts for varying degrees of imprecision aversion of the
agent displayed in Figures 4- 6. Hence we always have pP <p A since by Proposition 5 we know
that at the optimal ﬂexible contract the exhibit this property, pP = .5a n dpA varies between .5
25and .95.
We ﬁnd14 that when the beliefs’ diﬀerence is not too high (that is, .5 ≤ pA  .85) the optimal
ﬂexible contract is exactly the same as the one found above under imprecision aversion. This can
be understood as follows. Note ﬁrst that, for the parameter conﬁgurations of Table 1 expected
surplus (output net of costs) is higher in θ1 than in θ2.T h u sw h e nu(θ2) >u (θ1) the principal’s
expected proﬁts are higher in θ1. The payoﬀs of principal and agent vary anti-comonotonically
and in the opposite direction of what speculative trades would dictate. Hence we can say that in
this region the incentive enhancing role of ¯ w2 >w 2 and u(θ2) >u (θ1) prevails over the beneﬁts
of exploiting speculative trades and none of them occurs (analogously to what we saw before
happens for the beneﬁts of reducing the agency costs of imprecision aversion).
On the other hand, when the diﬀerence in beliefs is high, pA  .85, the optimal ﬂexible
contract with heterogeneous priors becomes rather diﬀerent from the one with imprecision aver-
sion: u(θ2) − u(θ1) is negative and not zero, and ¯ w1 − w1 keeps increasing instead of staying
constant. This can be explained by the fact that in this region the beliefs’ diﬀerence is so high
that the beneﬁts of exploiting it by engaging in speculative trades between principal and agent
now outweigh the incentive costs this implies. Hence we have a shift in the agent’s payoﬀs from
state θ2 to θ1 and viceversa for the principal, as the diﬀerence in beliefs would suggest. The
”cost” of this is a larger variability of the compensation in θ1, needed to sustain incentives. In
contrast, with imprecision aversion in this region the agent is fully insured, to minimize the
agency costs due to it, but it never pays as we noted to engage in speculative trades.
These properties also reveal themselves when we look at the proﬁt diﬀerential between ﬂexible
and rigid contracts. With imprecision aversion we saw such diﬀerence stays constant when −α
is increased beyond −.35, while with heterogenous priors we ﬁnd the diﬀerence is actually
increasing in pA when pA is increased beyond .85. Thus in such region increasing the beliefs’
diﬀerence makes the ﬂexible contract more proﬁtable compared to the rigid ones. This is due to
the fact that, as observed above, the optimal ﬂexible contract exhibits the presence of speculative
trades, and these are more proﬁtable the larger the diﬀerence in beliefs.
14The precise results are reported in Figures 7-9 in Appendix B. Notice that the characterization provided in
Proposition 1 does not always hold when p
P <p
A (while it does in the opposite case, p
P >p
A) and we have
therefore to resort to numerical methods.
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28Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is decomposed into three Propositions (A.1 to A.3)
Proposition A.1: At an optimal ﬂexible contract the compensation exhibits the following
properties: ¯ w1 ≥ ¯ w2 ≥ w2 ≥ w1, and ¯ w1 >w 1.F u r t h e r m o r e :
(i) if w2 >w 1,t h e n ¯ w1 > ¯ w2 and (IC2) and (IC6) are binding, while (IC1), (IC3), (IC4)
and (IC5) are slack.
(ii) if w2 = w1,t h e n ¯ w1 =¯ w2 and (IC2) binds, while (IC1), (IC3), and (IC6) are
automatically satisﬁed ((IC1) and (IC6) as equalities), and (IC4) and (IC5) are slack.15
Proof.
Step 1: At an optimal solution ¯ w2 ≥ w2.
Proof. Suppose not, that is, ¯ w2 <w 2.
Then, it is immediate to show, given that cy <c x, π(y,θ1) <π (x,θ1), and π(y,θ2) <π (x,θ2),
that both (IC1) and (IC5) are slack. Start with (IC1): the right hand side of (IC1) is strictly
greater than the right hand side of (IC2) and hence, (IC1) is slack. For (IC5), rewrite the
constraint as:
[π(y,θ2)e−a ¯ w2 +( 1− π(y,θ2))e−aw2]eacy ≤ [π(x,θ2)e−a ¯ w2 +( 1− π(x,θ2))e−aw2]eacx
Then, under the assumption, the expression in bracket in the left hand side is strictly smaller
than the one in the right hand side, which implies, together with the order on the cost, that
(IC5) is slack.
We now show that if ¯ w2 <w 2, then it is possible to ﬁnd an improvement for the principal
by pushing ¯ w2 and w2 closer. Consider Δ ¯ w2 > 0a n dΔ w2 < 0 (i.e. a discrete change in ¯ w2,w2)
such that:
(i) π(y,θ2)e−a(¯ w2+Δ ¯ w2−cy)+(1−π(y,θ2))e−a(w2+Δw2−cy) = π(y,θ2)e−a(¯ w2−cy)+(1−π(y,θ2))e−a(w2−cy)
and,
(ii) π(y,θ2)Δ ¯ w2 +( 1− π(y,θ2))Δw2 < 0
15The argument shows that the stated result holds whenever the agent’s utility function can be decomposed as
u(w − c)=u(w)u(−c)w i t hu (strictly) concave and increasing (i.e. not only for , CARA).
29Note that it is possible to ﬁnd such a Δ ¯ w2 and Δw2 by concavity of the utility function. By
condition (ii), we can conclude that this change improves the principal’s proﬁt. It remains to
show that it is feasible and satisﬁes the remaining incentive and the participation constraints.
(IC3) is trivially satisﬁed since it does not depend on Δ¯ w2 and Δw2. (IC4) and (IC6) are
satisﬁed by construction, given condition (i) and the same is true for (PC). Thus, it remains to
show that (IC2) holds. Given that the left hand side of (IC2) remains unchanged, it is enough
to show that:
π(y,θ1)e−a(¯ w2−cy)+(1−π(y,θ1))e−a(w2−cy) ≤ π(y,θ1)e−a(¯ w2+Δ ¯ w2−cy)+(1−π(y,θ1))e−a(w2+Δw2−cy)
This follows from condition (i) and the fact that π(y,θ1) <π (y,θ2). Indeed, (i) is equivalent
to π(y,θ2)[e−a(¯ w2+Δ ¯ w2) − e−a ¯ w2]+( 1− π(y,θ2))[e−a(w2+Δw2) − e−aw2]=0 . T h eﬁ r s tt e r mi s
negative while the second is positive, so we have, given that π(y,θ1) <π (y,θ2),
π(y,θ1)[e−a(¯ w2+Δ ¯ w2) − e−a ¯ w2]+( 1− π(y,θ1))[e−a(w2+Δw2) − e−aw2] > 0, which yields the
desired result. 
Step 2: At an optimal solution ¯ w1 >w 1.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of (IC3). 
Step 3: At an optimal solution (IC2) binds.
Proof. We distinguish two cases, according to whether w2 =¯ w2 or w2 < ¯ w2.
Case 1.: w2 =¯ w2 ≡ w2.
In that event, (IC5) is automatically satisﬁed and therefore can be dropped. Furthermore,
(IC2) implies (IC1) which can so also be dropped. Now, by Step 2 w1 < ¯ w1. Hence, given
that π(y,θ2) >π (y,θ1), it is possible to show that (IC2) and (IC6) imply (IC3), which can be
dropped.
Obviously, (IC2) and (IC4) cannot be simultaneously binding. We show next that (IC2) has
to bind and therefore (IC4) is slack. Assume not, i.e., (IC2) is slack and consider (an inﬁnitesimal
change) d ¯ w1 < 0, dw1 =0a n ddw2 > 0. Since (IC2) is slack, for suﬃciently small such quantities
it continues to hold. (IC4) and (IC6) remain satisﬁed. Choosing d ¯ w1 = −
(1−p)e−a(w2−cy)
pπ(x,θ1)e−a(¯ w1−cx)dw2
ensures that the participation constraint continues to hold. By construction, the change in the
objective function is equal to (1 − p)
 
e−a(w2−cy)
e−a(¯ w1−cx) − 1
 
dw2.G i v e n t h a t dw2 > 0, this quantity
is positive (hence leading to an increase in the objective function) if e−a(w2−cy) >e −a(¯ w1−cx),
30that is if ¯ w1 >w 2 +Δc. This property always holds in the case under consideration (w2 =¯ w2):
(IC2) can in fact be rewritten as follows:
π(x,θ1)e−a ¯ w1 +( 1− π(x,θ1))e−aw1 ≤ e−a(w2+Δc),
which in turn implies, together with the property ¯ w1 >w 1 established in Step 2, that e−a ¯ w1 <
e−a(w2+Δc), and therefore ¯ w1 >w 2 +Δ c.
Hence, whenever (IC2) is slack we can ﬁnd a perturbation of the wage bill that increases the
Principal’s proﬁt, contradicting optimality of the contract. Therefore (IC2) has to bind (and
hence (IC4) is slack).
Case 2.: w2 < ¯ w2.
Assume (IC2) is slack and consider a discrete change Δw2 > 0a n dΔ¯ w2 < 0 such that: (i)
π(y,θ2)Δ ¯ w2 +( 1− π(y,θ2)Δw2 < 0 and (ii) π(y,θ2)e−a(¯ w2+Δ ¯ w2) +( 1− π(y,θ2))e−a(¯ w2+Δw2) =
π(y,θ2)e−a ¯ w2 +( 1− π(y,θ2))e−a ¯ w2. Such numbers exist by strict concavity of u.
Notice that (IC3), (IC4), (IC6) and (PC) are unaﬀected by these changes and thus con-
tinue to hold. We now check (IC1). The left hand side is unchanged and we therefore need
to show that: π(x,θ1)e−a(¯ w2−cx) +( 1− π(x,θ1))e−a(w2−cx) ≤ π(x,θ1)e−a(¯ w2+Δ ¯ w2−cx) +( 1−
π(x,θ1))e−a(w2+Δw2−cx), which is equivalent to
π(x,θ1)[e−a ¯ w2 − e−a(¯ w2+Δ ¯ w2)]+( 1− π(x,θ1))[e−aw2 − e−a(w2+Δw2)] ≤ 0
But this holds as a consequence of (ii), given that Δw2 > 0a n dΔ¯ w2 < 0a n dπ(x,θ1) >π (y,θ2).
Thus, (IC1) continues to hold.
It remains to check (IC5). By construction, the left hand side is unaﬀected by the change.
Given that π(x,θ2) >π (y,θ2), one can replicate the argument showing that (IC1) holds to prove
that (IC5) holds as well. 
Step 4: At an optimal solution (IC4) is slack.
Proof. Given that ¯ w2 ≥ w2 and π(y,θ2) ≥ π(y,θ1), we have
π(y,θ2)e−a(¯ w2−cy) +( 1− π(y,θ2))e−a(w2−cy) ≤ π(y,θ1)e−a(¯ w2−cy) +( 1− π(y,θ1))e−a(w2−cy).
From the previous step, we know (IC2) is binding, and hence
π(y,θ2)e−a(¯ w2−cy) +( 1− π(y,θ2))e−a(w2−cy) ≤ π(x,θ1)e−a(¯ w1−cx) +( 1− π(x,θ1))e−a(w1−cx)
31Given that ¯ w1 >w 1 and π(x,θ1) ≥ π(x,θ2), this establishes that (IC4) is slack, i.e.
π(y,θ2)e−a(¯ w2−cy) +( 1− π(y,θ2))e−a(w2−cy) <π (x,θ2)e−a(¯ w1−cx) +( 1− π(x,θ2))e−a(w1−cx)

Step 5: At an optimal solution (IC5) is slack.
Proof. If ¯ w2 = w2, this is obvious. Consider next the case ¯ w2 >w 2. Then, π(y,θ2)e−a(¯ w2−cy)+
(1 − π(y,θ2))e−a(w2−cy) ≤ π(y,θ1)e−a(¯ w2−cy) +( 1− π(y,θ1))e−a(w2−cy).F r o mS t e p 3 w e k n o w
that (IC2) binds, i.e., π(y,θ1)e−a(¯ w2−cy) +( 1− π(y,θ1))e−a(w2−cy) = π(x,θ1)e−a(¯ w1−cx) +( 1−
π(x,θ1))e−a(w1−cx).
Now, by (IC1), π(x,θ1)e−a(¯ w1−cx) +( 1− π(x,θ1))e−a(w1−cx) ≤ π(x,θ1)e−a(¯ w2−cx) +( 1−
π(x,θ1))e−a(w2−cx) and hence, since ¯ w2 >w 2 and π(x,θ1) >π (x,θ2), π(x,θ1)e−a(¯ w1−cx) +( 1−
π(x,θ1))e−a(w1−cx) <π (x,θ2)e−a(¯ w2−cx) +( 1− π(x,θ2))e−a(w2−cx). As a consequence,
π(y,θ2)e−a(¯ w2−cy) +( 1− π(y,θ2))e−a(w2−cy) <π (x,θ2)e−a(¯ w2−cx) +( 1− π(x,θ2))e−a(w2−cx)
showing that (IC5) is slack. 
Step 6: At an optimal solution, ¯ w1 ≥ ¯ w2 and w1 ≤ w2.F u r t h e r m o r e ,i f w1 = w2,t h e ni t
m u s tb et h ec a s et h a t ¯ w1 =¯ w2.
Proof. Rewrite (IC1) and (IC6) as follows:
π(x,θ1)
 
e−a ¯ w1 − e−a ¯ w2 







e−a ¯ w2 − e−a ¯ w1 










e−a ¯ w1 − e−a ¯ w2 ≤
π(y,θ2)
1 − π(y,θ2)
But this is not possible given that π(y,θ2) <π (x,θ1). Hence, ¯ w1 ≥ ¯ w2. A similar argument
establishes that w1 ≤ w2.
Finally, suppose that w1 = w2. Then, using the fact that (IC2) is binding, one can rewrite
(IC3) as follows:
π(y,θ1)e−a(¯ w2−cy) +( 1− π(y,θ1))e−a(w2−cy) ≤ π(y,θ1)e−a(¯ w1−cy) +( 1− π(y,θ1))e−a(w1−cy)
which yields ¯ w1 =¯ w2, since we assumed that w1 = w2 and we proved above that ¯ w1 ≥ ¯ w2.. 
32Step 7: At an optimal solution (IC3) is slack if w1 <w 2.I fw1 = w2, (IC3) is automatically
satisﬁed as equality.
Proof. Use (IC2), which is binding, to rewrite (IC3) as follows:
π(y,θ1)e−a(¯ w2−cy) +(1−π(y,θ1))e−a(w2−cy) ≤ π(y,θ1)e−a(¯ w1−cy) +(1− π(y,θ1))e−a(w1−cy) (4)
If w1 <w 2, (4) is equivalent, given that ¯ w1 ≥ ¯ w2,t o
e−a ¯ w2 − e−a ¯ w1
e−aw1 − e−aw2 ≤
1 − π(y,θ1)
π(y,θ1)
But we know by (IC6) that
e−a ¯ w2 − e−a ¯ w1
e−aw1 − e−aw2 ≤
1 − π(y,θ2)
π(y,θ2)
and hence, since π(y,θ1) <π (y,θ2), (IC3) is slack.
If w1 = w2, then we know that ¯ w1 =¯ w2 and (4) - hence (IC3) - is automatically satisﬁed. 
Step 8: At an optimal solution (IC1) and (IC6) cannot be simultaneously binding if w1 <w 2.
If w1 = w2 they are both automatically satisﬁed (as equalities).




e−a ¯ w2 − e−a ¯ w1




Step 9: At an optimal solution, if w1 <w 2 (IC6) binds.
Proof. Assume w1 <w 2 and (IC6) is slack and consider changing ¯ w1 and w1 by respec-
tively Δ ¯ w1 < 0a n dΔ w1 > 0 such that, (i) π(x,θ1)Δ ¯ w1 +( 1− π(x,θ1))Δw1 < 0 and (ii),
π(x,θ1)e−a(¯ w1+Δ ¯ w1) +( 1− π(x,θ1))e−a(w1+Δw1) = π(x,θ1)e−a ¯ w1 +( 1− π(x,θ1))e−aw1. Such a
change exists by strict concavity of the utility function and provides higher proﬁt to the principal.
Furthermore, this change does not aﬀect (IC1), (IC2), and (PC) and is feasible given that
(IC3), (IC4), (IC5) and (IC6) are slack. Hence, (IC6) has to be binding at an optimal solution
whenever w1 <w 2. 
Steps 1-9 complete the proof of Proposition A.1. From this result it then immediately follows:
33Corollary A.1: The optimal ﬂexible contract can be obtained as a solution to the simpler pro-
gramme below:
max ¯ w1,w1, ¯ w2,w2 p[π(x,θ1)( ¯ R − ¯ w1)+( 1− π(x,θ1))(R − w1)]




(IC2),(IC6),(PC) (as stated in (Pflex)) and
(WI)¯ w1 ≥ ¯ w2
(WII)¯ w2 ≥ w2
(Pflex,R)
Observe the constraint w2 ≥ w1 is implied by (W1) and (IC6).
Proposition A.2: A necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of a solution to
problem (Pflex,R) (and hence also to (Pflex)) is that
1−π(y,θ1)
1−π(x,θ1) ≥ eaΔc.
Proof. (Necessity) Assume that (IC2) and (IC6) hold as equalities and wages are ordered
¯ w1 ≥ ¯ w2 ≥ w2 ≥ w1.
¿From (IC6) holding as equality, we get π(y,θ2)(e−a ¯ w2 −e−a ¯ w1)=( 1−π(y,θ2))(e−aw1 −e−aw2)
and, given that the two terms are non-negative and π(y,θ2) >π (y,θ1):
π(y,θ1)(e−a ¯ w2 − e−a ¯ w1) ≤ (1 − π(y,θ1))(e−aw1 − e−aw2)
i.e., π(y,θ1)e−a(¯ w2−cy) +( 1− π(y,θ1))e−a(w2−cy) ≤ π(y,θ1)e−a(¯ w1−cy) +( 1− π(y,θ1))e−a(w1−cy).
Using (IC2) this implies that
π(x,θ1)e−a(¯ w1−cx) +( 1− π(x,θ1))e−a(w1−cx) ≤ π(y,θ1)e−a(¯ w1−cy) +( 1− π(y,θ1))e−a(w1−cy)
or
(π(x,θ1)eaΔc − π(y,θ1))e−a(¯ w1−cy) ≤ ((1 − π(y,θ1)) − (1 − π(x,θ1)eaΔc))e−a(w1−cy)





The two binding constraints (IC2) and (IC6) enable one to solve for ¯ z1 = e−a ¯ w1 and z1 ≡
e−aw1 as a function of ¯ z2 ≡ e−a ¯ w2 and z2 ≡ e−aw2, yielding:
34¯ z1 =
 





π(xθ1)[π(y,θ2)¯ z2 +( 1− π(y,θ2))z2] − π(y,θ2)[π(y,θ1)¯ z2 +( 1− π(y,θ1))z2]e−aΔc 
π(x,θ1) − π(y,θ2)
We now want to establish that under the condition
1−π(y,θ1)
1−π(x,θ1) ≥ eaΔc, it is possible to ﬁnd
0 ≤ ¯ z2 ≤ z2 such that:
¯ z1 > 0
¯ z1 ≤ ¯ z2
z2 ≤ z1
¯ z2 ≤ z2
These inequalities ensure that values of the wages satisfying ¯ w1 ≥ ¯ w2 ≥ w2 ≥ w1 can be found.
The ﬁrst inequality is equivalent, under the condition
1−π(y,θ1)
1−π(x,θ1) ≥ eaΔc, to
(1 − π(x,θ1))π(y,θ2) − (1 − π(y,θ2))π(y,θ1)e−aΔc





The next two inequalities are actually equivalent (again under the condition
1−π(y,θ1)
1−π(x,θ1) ≥ eaΔc)
to the same inequality:
π(x,θ1) − π(y,θ1)e−aΔc





Thus, to show that we can ﬁnd some values ¯ z2,z2 satisfying the last inequality, ¯ z2 ≤ z2, and




(1 − π(x,θ1))π(y,θ2) − (1 − π(y,θ2))π(y,θ1)e−aΔc




(1 − π(y,θ1))e−aΔc − (1 − π(x,θ1))
Straightforward computation shows that, under the assumption that
1−π(y,θ1)
1−π(x,θ1) ≥ eaΔc, this
is indeed the case.
Before solving problem (Pflex,R), observe that one can rewrite it, with the following change
35of variables z = e−aw, as a problem with a (strictly) concave objective and linear constraints:
max¯ z1,z1,¯ z2,z2 p[π(x,θ1)( ¯ R +
log ¯ z1
a )+( 1− π(x,θ1))(R +
logz1
a )]
+(1 − p)[π(y,θ2)( ¯ R +
log ¯ z2




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
(IC2 ) π(x,θ1)eacx¯ z1 +( 1− π(x,θ1))eacxz1 = π(y,θ1)eacy¯ z2 +( 1− π(y,θ1))eacyz2
(IC6 ) π(y,θ2)eacy¯ z2 +( 1− π(y,θ2))eacyz2 = π(y,θ2)eacy¯ z1 +( 1− π(y,θ2))eacyz1
(PC ) p[π(x,θ1)eacx¯ z1 +( 1− π(x,θ1))eacxz1]+
(1 − p)[π(y,θ2)eacy¯ z2 +( 1− π(y,θ2))eacyz2] ≤ e−a¯ u
(WI )¯ z1 ≤ ¯ z2
(WII )¯ z2 ≤ z2
(  Pflex,R)
Proposition A.3: At a solution to the program (   Pflex,R), (PC
 ) binds. Furthermore,
we have that ¯ w2 >w 2.
Proof. Consider the program (  Pflex,R). Let λ2, λ6, λPC, λI,a n dλII denote the Lagrange
multipliers associated to the constraints of this problem. The ﬁrst order conditions obtained by
diﬀerentiating the Lagrangean with respect to ¯ z1, ¯ z2,z2,z1 are then:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
(i)
pπ(x,θ1)
a¯ z1 = λ2π(x,θ1)eacx − λ6π(y,θ2)eacy + λPCpπ(x,θ1)eacx + λI
(ii)
p(1−π(x,θ1))




a¯ z2 = −λ2π(y,θ1)eacy + λ6π(y,θ2)eacy
+λPC(1 − p)π(y,θ2)eacy − λI + λII
(iv)
(1−p)(1−π(y,θ2))
az2 = −λ2(1 − π(y,θ1))eacy + λ6(1 − π(y,θ2))eacy
+λPC(1 − p)(1 − π(y,θ2))eacy − λII
Multiplying each equation by the appropriate z variable, adding the four equations of the
above system and using the fact that (IC2 )a n d( IC6) , in the above speciﬁcation of the
optimization problem, are written as equalities, yields the following:
1
a = λPC[pπ(x,θ1)eacx¯ z1 + p(1 − π(x,θ1))eacxz1
+(1 − p)π(y,θ2)eacy¯ z2 +( 1− p)(1 − π(y,θ2))eacyz2]+λI[¯ z1 − ¯ z2]+λII[¯ z2 − z2]
Using the complementarity slackness condition, we get that λI[¯ z1 − ¯ z2]=λII[¯ z2 − z2]=0 .
Hence λPC > 0, which establishes that (PC ) binds. Hence, we can conclude from the expression
above that λPC = ea¯ u
a .
36Next we want to show that ¯ w2 >w 2 or equivalently z2 > ¯ z2. Assume to the contrary that
¯ z2 = z2 ≡ z2. We know in that case that (WI) is slack (otherwise by (IC6 ) all wages would have
to be equal, but this would contradict the fact that (IC2 ) binds) and hence λI =0 . R e w r i t e
now FOC’s (iii)a n d( iv)a s : ⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨



























or, after some simpliﬁcation,
λII =( π(y,θ1) − π(y,θ2))λ2eacy
Note that (π(y,θ1) − π(y,θ2)) < 0 and hence λII ≥ 0i ﬀλ2 ≤ 0. Next observe that (PC )
as an equality together with (IC2 )i m p l y ,i f¯ z2 = z2 ≡ z2, that z2 = e−a(cy+¯ u).P l u g n o wt h e
values of λPC and z2 into equations (iii)a n d( iv) and use the expression for λII obtained above.
The two equations are identical and yield λ6 = λ2 ≡ λ.
We have so a system of four equations – FOC’s (i)a n d( ii), (IC2 )a n d( IC6 ) – to determine
three variables: λ,¯ z1 and z1.( IC2 )a n d( IC6 ) can be used to solve directly for ¯ z1 and z1.
Now, the two FOC’s can be rewritten:
pπ(x,θ1)=aλ¯ z1(π(x,θ1)eacx − π(y,θ2)eacy)+ea¯ u¯ z1pπ(x,θ1)eacx
p(1 − π(x,θ1)) = aλz1((1 − π(x,θ1))eacx − (1 − π(y,θ2))eacy)+ea¯ uz1p(1 − π(x,θ1))eacx
Adding these two equations yields an equation
p = aλ[¯ z1(π(x,θ1)eacx + z1(1 − π(x,θ1))eacx − π(y,θ2)¯ z1eacy − z1(1 − π(y,θ2))eacy]+
+pea¯ u [¯ z1π(x,θ1)eacx + z1(1 − π(x,θ1))eacx]
which, using (IC2 )a n d( IC6 ) can be rewritten as:
p = aλ
 










37always satisﬁed, so that one of the two above equations can be dropped. The remaining one can
be used to solve for λ. Recall that λ ≤ 0 is needed to ensure that λII ≥ 0.
Solving then (IC2 )a n d( IC6 ) with respect to ¯ z1 and z1 we get:
z1 =
π(x,θ1)e−a(cy+¯ u) − π(y,θ2)e−a(cx+¯ u)
π(x,θ1) − π(y,θ2)
¯ z1 =
(1 − π(y,θ2))e−a(cx+¯ u) − (1 − π(x,θ1))e−a(cy+¯ u)
π(x,θ1) − π(y,θ2)
.
Substituting into the ﬁrst of the two FOC’s above yields:
pπ(x,θ1)= [ aλ(π(x,θ1)eacx − π(y,θ2)eacy)+ea¯ upπ(x,θ1)eacx]·
·




(1 − π(y,θ2))e−a(cx+¯ u) − (1 − π(x,θ1))e−a(cy+¯ u)
π(x,θ1) − π(y,θ2)
(7)















Since the coeﬃcient of λ in the ﬁrst term is positive, it follows that the solution for λ of such
equation is > 0, a contradiction. Hence, it cannot be that ¯ z2 = z2.
This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2.
The ﬁrst best optimal contract is obtained as solution of the problem of maximizing the
principal’s expected proﬁts subject to the agent’s participation constraint, which under risk
neutrality takes the following form:
max ¯ w1,w1, ¯ w2,w2 p[π(x,θ1)( ¯ R − ¯ w1)+( 1− π(x,θ1))(R − w1)]
+(1 − p)[π(y,θ2)( ¯ R − ¯ w2)+( 1− π(y,θ2))(R − w2)]
s.t.
p[π(x,θ1)¯ w1 +( 1− π(x,θ1))w1 − cx]+
(1 − p)[π(y,θ2)¯ w2 +( 1− π(y,θ2))w2 − cy] ≥ ¯ u
The maximal level of the principal’s expected proﬁts that can be attained at a solution of
this problem is then clearly the one stated in the proposition and it is immediate to verify that
38the compensation proﬁle given in (1) yields such level of expected proﬁts and is then a ﬁrst
best optimum. It remains thus to verify the values in (1) satisfy all the incentive compatibility
constraints, which under risk neutrality take the following form:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
π(x,θ1)¯ w1 +( 1− π(x,θ1))w1 ≥ π(x,θ1)¯ w2 +( 1− π(x,θ1))w2
π(x,θ1)¯ w1 +( 1− π(x,θ1))w1 − cx ≥ π(y,θ1)¯ w2 +( 1− π(y,θ1))w2 − cy
π(x,θ1)¯ w1 +( 1− π(x,θ1))w1 − cx ≥ π(y,θ1)¯ w1 +( 1− π(y,θ1))w1 − cy
π(y,θ2)¯ w2 +( 1− π(y,θ2))w2 − cy ≥ π(x,θ2)¯ w1 +( 1− π(x,θ2))w1 − cx
π(y,θ2)¯ w2 +( 1− π(y,θ2))w2 − cy ≥ π(x,θ2)¯ w2 +( 1− π(x,θ2))w2 − cx
π(y,θ2)¯ w2 +( 1− π(y,θ2))w2 ≥ π(y,θ2)¯ w1 +( 1− π(y,θ2))w1
(8)
This is immediate by direct substitution. 
Proof of Proposition 3.
Let us consider ﬁrst the solution of the principal’s problem when the incentive constraints
are ignored, that is the ﬁrst best contract. We ﬁrst show that at such contract expected proﬁts
and wages net of cost across the θ states are comonotonic, i.e.,
{π(x,θ1)¯ w1 +( 1− π(x,θ1))w1 − cx − (π(y,θ2)¯ w2 +( 1− π(y,θ2))w2 − cy)}×
{π(x,θ1)( ¯ R − ¯ w1)+( 1− π(x,θ1))(R − w1) − (π(y,θ2)( ¯ R − ¯ w2)+( 1− π(y,θ2))(R − w2))}≥0
Assume, by contradiction, that π(x,θ1)¯ w1 +( 1− π(x,θ1))w1 − cx <π (y,θ2)¯ w2 +( 1−
π(y,θ2))w2 − cy while π(x,θ1)( ¯ R − ¯ w1)+( 1− π(x,θ1))(R − w1) >π (y,θ2)( ¯ R − ¯ w2)+( 1−
π(y,θ2))(R − w2). Then, change the wage schedule by adding ε>0 to the expected wage
in θ1 and subtracting
¯ p−α
1−¯ p+αε to the expected wage in state θ2. Straightforward computation
shows that this improves the principal’s proﬁt while leaving the agent’s utility constant. This
constitutes a contradiction to the fact that we were at a solution to the ﬁrst best.
The other case, namely π(x,θ1)¯ w1+(1−π(x,θ1))w1−cx >π (y,θ2)¯ w2+(1−π(y,θ2))w2−cy
while π(x,θ1)( ¯ R − ¯ w1)+(1− π(x,θ1))(R −w1) <π (y,θ2)( ¯ R − ¯ w2)+(1−π(y,θ2))(R −w2)c a n
be treated in a symmetric manner.
Hence, utility and proﬁt are comonotonic. We proceed now to show that the full insurance
property stated in the proposition hold at the ﬁrst best. Examine ﬁrst the case where (π(x,θ1)−
π(y,θ2))( ¯ R−R) > Δc. In this case, comonotonicity implies that proﬁt and utility are higher in
state θ1 than in state θ2. Suppose they are both strictly higher in θ1 than in θ2: π(x,θ1)¯ w1+(1−
π(x,θ1))w1−cx >π (y,θ2)¯ w2+(1−π(y,θ2))w2−cy and π(x,θ1)( ¯ R− ¯ w1)+(1−π(x,θ1))(R−w1) >
39π(y,θ2)( ¯ R− ¯ w2)+(1−π(y,θ2))(R−w2). As a consequence, the principal uses beliefs p+α and
the agent p + ψ. We show next this cannot happen at an optimum.
Consider a change in the expected wage in θ1 by an amount ε together with a variation of
the expected wage in θ2 by −
p+α
1−p−αε. This leaves the agent’s utility unchanged while the change
in the expected wage bill for the principal is
(ψ−α)
1−p−αε. It follows that, when ψ>αthe principal’s
expected wage bill decreases, and hence proﬁts increase, as a result of such change, as long as
ε<0. Such change implies then that the expected wage payments in θ1 decrease, while those
in θ2 increase (i.e., the agent is oﬀered more insurance across the states θ1 and θ2). Since the
argument applies as long as π(x,θ1)¯ w1+(1−π(x,θ1))w1−cx >π (y,θ2)¯ w2+(1−π(y,θ2))w2−cy
and π(x,θ1)( ¯ R − ¯ w1)+( 1− π(x,θ1))(R − w1) >π (y,θ2)( ¯ R − ¯ w2)+( 1− π(y,θ2))(R − w2), it
establishes that the solution when ψ>αis such that the agent is fully insured: π(x,θ1)¯ w1 +
(1 − π(x,θ1))w1 − cx = π(y,θ2)¯ w2 +( 1− π(y,θ2))w2 − cy.
When α>ψthe reverse is true, the principal’s proﬁts increase if ε>0, i.e. the expected
wage payments in θ1 increase, while those in θ2 decrease. The optimum obtains then when the
principal is fully insured: π(x,θ1)( ¯ R − ¯ w1)+( 1− π(x,θ1))(R − w1)=π(y,θ2)( ¯ R − ¯ w2)+( 1−
π(y,θ2))(R − w2).
A reasoning along the same lines allows us to establish that also in the other possible pa-
rameter conﬁguration, where (π(x,θ1) − π(y,θ2))( ¯ R − R) < Δc, the agent is fully insured when
he is more imprecision averse than the principal and vice versa.
It remains then to show that we can always ﬁnd a ﬁrst best optimum contract at which
the incentive constraints are satisﬁed. When ψ>αthe ﬁrst best contract is the same as
when principal and agent have a single prior belief over θ, for which we showed in the proof
of Proposition 2 the incentive constraints are satisﬁed. We show below that the same is true
also when ψ<α , that is when the ﬁrst best optimum prescribes the principal is fully insured.
Hence,
π(x,θ1)¯ w1 +( 1− π(x,θ1))w1 − [π(y,θ2)¯ w2 +( 1− π(y,θ2))w2]=( π(x,θ1) − π(y,θ2))( ¯ R − R)







¯ R − R, Δc
π(x,θ2)−π(y,θ2)
 
≥ ¯ w2 − w2 ≥
Δc−(π(x,θ1)−π(y,θ2))( ¯ R−R)
π(y,θ2)−π(y,θ1)





π(x,θ1)−π(x,θ2) , ¯ R − R
 
The condition on ¯ w1 − w1 can always be satisﬁed. Hence a necessary and suﬃcient condition
for the ﬁrst best to be implementable is that
min
 





Δc − (π(x,θ1) − π(y,θ2))( ¯ R − R)
π(y,θ2) − π(y,θ1)






Δc. The ﬁrst inequality holds by Assumption 3. The second one can
be rewritten as follows: (π(x,θ1) − π(y,θ1))( ¯ R − R) − (π(y,θ2) − π(y,θ1))( ¯ R − R) > Δc −
π(y,θ2)−π(y,θ1)
π(x,θ2)−π(y,θ2)Δc. Using again Assumption 3, we see that this condition is met whenever −(π(y,θ2)−
π(y,θ1))( ¯ R − R) > −
π(y,θ2)−π(y,θ1)
π(x,θ2)−π(y,θ2)Δc always satisﬁed under Assumption 3. 
Proof of Proposition 4.
To establish the ﬁrst part of the proposition, we compare the principal’s expected utility at
the ﬁrst best and at the two rigid contracts. The utility at the ﬁrst best, for the various possible
parameter conﬁgurations, are reported in Table 3:
(π(x,θ1) − π(y,θ2))( ¯ R − R) > Δc (π(x,θ1) − π(y,θ2))( ¯ R − R) < Δc
ψ>α (p + ψ)[π(x,θ1) ¯ R +( 1− π(x,θ1))R − cx]+ (¯ p − ψ)[π(x,θ1) ¯ R +( 1− π(x,θ1)R) − cx]+
(1 − p − ψ)[π(y,θ2) ¯ R +( 1− π(y,θ2)R) − cy] (1 − ¯ p + ψ)[π(y,θ2) ¯ R +( 1− π(y,θ2)R) − cy]
−¯ u −¯ u
ψ<α (p + α)[π(x,θ1) ¯ R +( 1− π(x,θ1))R − cx]+ (¯ p − α)[π(x,θ1) ¯ R +( 1− π(x,θ1)R) − cx]+
(1 − p − α)[π(y,θ2) ¯ R +( 1− π(y,θ2)R) − cy] (1 − ¯ p + α)[π(y,θ2) ¯ R +( 1− π(y,θ2)R) − cy]
−¯ u −¯ u
Table 3: Principal’s utility at the ﬁrst best
Tedious but straightforward computations yield the utility for the two rigid contracts re-
ported in Table 4.
41x-contract y-contract
ψ>α (p + ψ)[π(x,θ1) ¯ R +( 1− π(x,θ1))R]+ (¯ p − ψ)[π(y,θ1) ¯ R +( 1− π(y,θ1))R]+
(1 − p − ψ)[π(x,θ2) ¯ R +( 1− π(x,θ2))R] (1 − ¯ p + ψ)[π(y,θ2) ¯ R +( 1− π(y,θ2))R]
−¯ u − cx −¯ u − cy
ψ<α (p + α)[π(x,θ1) ¯ R +( 1− π(x,θ1))R]+ (¯ p − α)[π(y,θ1) ¯ R +( 1− π(y,θ1))R]+
(1 − p − α)[π(x,θ2) ¯ R +( 1− π(x,θ2))R] (1 − ¯ p + α)[π(y,θ2) ¯ R +( 1− π(y,θ2))R]
−¯ u − cx −¯ u − cy
Table 4: Principal’s utility at the rigid contracts
Considering each of the eight possible cases, we ﬁnd that the ﬁrst best ﬂexible contract
is preferred to the two rigid contracts if and only if the condition stated in Assumption 3 is
satisﬁed.
The second part of the claim in the proposition then derives directly from the expressions
for the principal’s expected utility derived above.
Proof of Proposition 5.
Careful inspection of steps 1 to 9 of the proof of Proposition A.1, for the case where the
parties have sharp probabilistic beliefs, reveals that the same argument goes through also with
ambiguity. Note in fact that such steps rely either on a manipulation of the incentive constraints,
which are unchanged as we argued, or on some optimality arguments. Two types of optimality
arguments in particular are used. The ﬁrst one concerns changes of the compensation within
a given state; this does not depend on the beliefs over θ and only relies on the concavity of the
agent’s utility function. The second type of argument considers changes of wages - and hence
utility - across states and clearly depends on the beliefs over θ. This only appears in establishing
case 1 of Step 3. We show here that the same line of reasoning holds with imprecision aversion,
provided the principal is less imprecision averse than the agent.
Let’s establish that (IC2) has to be binding when w2 is constant (as in case 1 of step 3 of
Proposition A.1). Suppose (IC2) is slack and w2 constant. This implies that the utility of the
agent is higher in state θ1 than in state θ2.H et h u su s e sp+α in his computation of the expected
utility. Consider again (an inﬁnitesimal change) d ¯ w1 < 0, dw1 =0a n ddw2 > 0 but now deﬁned




e−a(¯ w1−cx)dw2, so that the participation constraint still
holds. We will show that this change increases the principal’s proﬁt. Let p ∈ [p + ψ, ¯ p − ψ]b e
42the probability used by the principal in his evaluation of the expected proﬁt. The change in
proﬁt is then equal to  
p
(1 − p − α)
(p + α)
e−a(w2−cy)
e−a(w1−cx) − (1 − p)
 
dw2





p . Observe now that
(IC2) can be rewritten as follows:
π(x,θ1)e−a ¯ w1 +( 1− π(x,θ1))e−aw1 ≤ e−a(w2+Δc),
which in turn implies, by convexity of e−ax,t h a te−a(π(x,θ1)¯ w1+(1−π(x,θ1))w1) <e −a(w2+Δc).
Hence a suﬃcient condition for the changes considered to be beneﬁcial to the principal is that:




p . Since we established that ¯ w1 >w 1, and hence ea(1−π(x,θ1))( ¯ w1−w1) >




p < 1o re q u i v a l e n t l yp>p+ α,a l w a y st r u e
when ψ ≥ α, i.e., under the assumption that the principal is less (or equally) imprecision averse
than the agent.
Hence, the optimal contract is the solution to:
max ¯ w1,w1, ¯ w2,w2 minp∈[p+ψ,¯ p−ψ] p[π(x,θ1)( ¯ R − ¯ w1)+( 1− π(x,θ1))(R − w1)]
+(1 − p)[π(y,θ2)( ¯ R − ¯ w2)+( 1− π(y,θ2))(R − w2)]
s.t. (IC2),(IC6) (as stated in (Pflex)) and
(PC)m a x p∈[p+α,¯ p−α]
 
p[π(x,θ1)e−a(¯ w1−cx) +( 1− π(x,θ1))e−a(w1−cx)]+
(1 − p)[π(y,θ2)e−a(¯ w2−cy) +( 1− π(y,θ2))e−a(w2−cy)]
 
≤ e−a¯ u
(WI)¯ w1 ≥ ¯ w2
(WII)¯ w2 ≥ w2

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